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No Shelter from the Storm: Undocumented 
Populations and Federal Disaster Aid 
Ashley Morey1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the United States experienced hurricanes, wildfires, flooding, 
tornadoes, earthquakes, and droughts throughout the country.2 The 
economic cost of these disasters was $35 billion—three times greater than 
the average annual cost of disasters in the United States.3 Many scientists 
theorize that disasters are becoming more common, or at least more severe, 
due to climate change and destruction of natural barriers such as coastal 
marshlands.4 Hurricane Katrina, for example, was especially severe because 
the coastal marshland in Louisiana had been systematically destroyed by 
development and pollution, leaving very little intact to absorb the storm 
surge.5 
Disasters are problematic not simply because they are becoming more 
frequent and more severe, but because they can destroy infrastructure and 
use up valuable resources.6 Disasters can destroy roads, levees, buildings, 
and communications systems.7 Government and nongovernment 
                                                 
1  The author would like to thank Professor Cliff Villa for his generous and invaluable 
guidance and feedback throughout the process of writing this article. 
2 2011 Federal Disaster Declarations, FEMA (Mar. 15, 2012, 2:55 PM), 
http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters.fema?year=2011. 
3 Earthquakes Prompt Record Insurance Claims in 2011, REUTERS, Jan. 4, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/04/us-munichre-earthquakes-
idUSTRE8030KM20120104. 
4 ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A 
POST-KATRINA WORLD 30 (2010); Weather and Climate Extremes in a Changing 
Climate, US CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM 1 (June 2008), 
http://downloads.climatescience.gov/sap/sap3-3/sap3-3-final-all.pdf. 
5 VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 30–31. 
6 DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 10 (2d ed. 2010). 
7 Id. at 3. 
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organizations can be prevented from distributing aid upon which  
populations rely.8 Court systems can be caught off guard if courthouses and 
records are destroyed, and this can impede access to legal remedies.9 
Disasters also require coordination of emergency resources: evacuation 
assistance, emergency shelter, food, and medicine. If these resources are 
handled poorly or distributed slowly, people will die. The nation witnessed 
this after Hurricane Katrina.10 
An often-repeated sentiment in disaster law scholarship is that although 
disasters are said to be “great equalizers,” they actually reinforce 
disparities.11 The poor feel the impacts of disasters most acutely because 
they are more likely to lack the resources (e.g., transportation and money) 
needed to evacuate. Non-English speakers often have limited notice that a 
dangerous situation is arising due to their lack of contact with mainstream 
means of communication or because warnings are not widely disseminated 
in other languages.12 Finally, the poor and minorities tend to live in the 
areas most vulnerable to disaster.13 
The impacts of disasters are amplified in undocumented populations. In 
addition to financial and social issues that uniquely affect them, 
undocumented populations are barred from receiving most kinds of federal 
                                                 
8 See id. 
9 See Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The Constitution 
After Hurricane Katrina, 56 DUKE L.J. 127, 128 (2006) (discussing how thousands of 
detainees were left without remedies after Hurricane Katrina). 
10 FARBER ET AL., supra note 6, at 149. 
11 See id. at 204; VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 106. 
12 INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, BOALT HALL SCH. OF 
LAW, WHEN DISASTER STRIKES: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF THE 2005 GULF 
COAST HURRICANES 21 (Mar. 2006),  available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ 
IHRLC/Briefing_Paper_Report_When_Disaster_Strikes_2_Mar_06.pdf [hereinafter 
WHEN DISASTER STRIKES]. 
13 Susan L. Cutter, The Geography of Social Vulnerability: Race, Class, and 
Catastrophe, SSRC.ORG (June 11, 2006), http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Cutter/; 
VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 107. 
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aid.14 Undocumented populations also have an acute, and understandable, 
fear of detention and deportation, which prevents them from utilizing 
available government resources after disasters.15 The United States is home 
to nearly 12 million undocumented immigrants, and neglecting them in 
times of crisis is a violation of human rights.16 As disasters become more 
common and more severe, the United States’ disaster policies should not be 
shaped by the immigration policy debate, but rather by our commitment to 
providing safety and security for all people affected by disasters. 
This article addresses the issue of undocumented immigrants and disaster 
aid by discussing current demographic trends, barriers to obtaining disaster 
aid, current federal policies and their consequences, and the manner in 
which other organizations manage these situations. It then proposes 
relatively minor modifications to the existing disaster response structure 
that will drastically increase the ability of undocumented immigrants to 
access aid. 
                                                 
14 ELLEN RUTH WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33091, HURRICANE KATRINA-
RELATED IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND LEGISLATION 3 (2005), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/53687.pdf. 
15 US DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., DEVELOPING CULTURAL COMPETENCE IN 
DISASTER MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS: GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 15, 28 (2003), available at http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content// 
SMA11-DISASTER/SMA11-DISASTER-01.pdf [hereinafter HHS, CULTURAL 
COMPETENCE]. 
16 See id.; Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in 
the United States, PEW HISP. CENTER 1 (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.pewhispanic.org/ 
files/reports/107.pdf. Undocumented immigrants account for 4 percent of the overall 
population in the United States, as well as 30 percent of the total foreign-born population. 
Id. See also VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 186–87. 
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A. The Changing Number and Distribution of Undocumented Immigrants in 
the United States 
Undocumented immigrants account for 4 percent of the overall United 
States population.17 As this group becomes more diverse and settles in more 
states, any solution to the lack of disaster assistance for undocumented 
immigrants will need to be multifaceted and complex. 
The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that there are nearly 12 million 
undocumented immigrants living in the United States.18 Although Mexicans 
comprise 59 percent of the undocumented population, a significant number 
of undocumented immigrants come from Central America (11 percent) and 
South and East Asia (11 percent).19 A lesser proportion comes from South 
America (7 percent), Europe and Canada (4.5 percent), the Caribbean (4 
percent), and the Middle East (less than 2 percent).20 
The undocumented population in the United States is also diverse in 
terms of its location. While it used to be true that most undocumented 
immigrants concentrated in border states, today, many immigrants move to 
other regions throughout the country.21 For instance, in 1990, California 
was home to 42 percent of the nation’s 3.5 million undocumented 
immigrants,22 and now, California houses only 22 percent of the 11.9 
million undocumented immigrants in the United States.23 Meanwhile, states 
in the mid-Atlantic, Southeast, Midwest, and Mountain regions have 
doubled their proportions of undocumented immigrants since 1990.24 
                                                 
17 Passel & Cohn, supra note 16 at 2–3. 
18 Id. at 1. 
19 Id. at 21. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at i. 
22 Id. at i. 
23 Id. at 1–2. 
24 Id. at 2. 
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B. Disparities Between Undocumented People and US-Born Residents 
Undocumented immigrants face a host of issues that US-born residents 
are either unlikely to encounter or tend to experience less drastically. 
Undocumented immigrants often receive less education, make less money, 
and are less likely to be insured than US-born residents. Additionally, 
undocumented people are subject to racist and discriminatory attitudes. All 
of these factors contribute to a heightened need for disaster aid. 
Undocumented immigrants are considerably less likely to be educated 
than US-born residents and authorized immigrants. For instance, while only 
2 percent of US-born adults and 13 percent of authorized immigrants 
between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-four have less than a ninth-grade 
education, a staggering 29 percent of undocumented immigrants in the same 
age range have not completed any high school coursework.25 The statistics 
are similar across the educational spectrum for this age group: US-born 
residents and authorized immigrants tend to be at least twice as likely to 
have achieved every educational level.26 The trend for those between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-four is similarly shocking. While 15 percent of 
authorized immigrants and 8 percent of US-born residents in this age group 
have not completed high school, the proportion of undocumented 
immigrants who have not completed high school is 40 percent.27 
Undocumented workers are also more likely to have low-skilled jobs than 
US-born residents. Less than one-third of US-born residents hold jobs in the 
service, construction, production, and installation industries, whereas a full 
two-thirds of undocumented immigrants hold such jobs.28 While 
undocumented workers represent only 4 percent of the US population, they 
                                                 
25 Id. at 11. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 14. 
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make up 25 percent of all farm workers, 37 percent of all drywall installers, 
28 percent of dishwashers, and 27 percent of housekeepers and maids.29 
The combination of lack of education, low-skill jobs, and lack of status 
prevents undocumented immigrants from earning as much as US-born 
residents and authorized immigrants, even over time. The median income 
for US-born households is $50,000 per year.30 The median income of 
authorized immigrants who have been in the United States fewer than ten 
years is around $41,000 per year, but after ten years in the United States, 
their median income increases to about $54,000 per year.31 Alternatively, 
undocumented immigrants with fewer than ten years in the United States 
have a median annual household income of $33,000. Even after a decade in 
the United States, the annual salaries of undocumented households 
increases by only $3,000.32 The fact that undocumented immigrants tend to 
have more workers per household than US-born residents makes this 
disparity even more notable.33 
Finally, undocumented immigrants are less likely to be covered by health 
insurance than US-born residents. While 24 percent of authorized 
immigrants and 14 percent of US-born adults did not have health insurance 
at any time in 2007, 60 percent of undocumented adults were without health 
insurance during the same period.34 Similarly, 8 percent of children of US-
born parents did not have health insurance at any point in 2007, compared 
with 25 percent of US-born children of undocumented parents and 45 
percent of undocumented children. 
These education, vocation, wage, and insurance statistics demonstrate the 
challenges encountered by undocumented immigrants in the United States. 
                                                 
29 Id. at 15. 
30 Id. at 16. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. US born households have 1.23 workers per household, whereas households headed 
by an undocumented immigrant have 1.75 workers per household. Id. 
34 Id. at 18. 
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These challenges are particularly important to note in a discussion of the 
effects of disasters on undocumented immigrants. For example, lack of 
money and health insurance can make recovery from, and even survival of, 
a disaster considerably more difficult. 
C. Barriers to Obtaining Disaster Aid 
There are two primary barriers between undocumented people and 
disaster aid: logistic barriers and fear-based barriers. Logistic barriers 
encompass lack of information about undocumented populations, lack of 
resources, poor communication, and loss of documentation or status. Fear-
based barriers stem from a general distrust by undocumented people of 
government authorities. This section explores how undocumented people 
experience these barriers before and after a disaster. 
1. Logistic Barriers 
Logistic issues surrounding access to aid for undocumented people occur 
before and after disasters.35 Many of the logistic barriers plague all 
immigrants, particularly those with limited means or lack of English-
language proficiency.36 Although these logistic barriers are not unique to 
undocumented immigrants, they arguably have a harsher impact on them.37 
First, there is a lack of information about undocumented populations 
which affects the ability of the government to warn people about a disaster 
before it happens.38 Governments, at every level, have inadequate 
information about undocumented populations (as well as homeless 
populations and even tourist populations) that inhabit potentially dangerous 
areas, such as regions likely to be affected by hurricanes or urban areas that 
                                                 
35 WHEN DISASTER STRIKES, supra note 12, at 21–22. 
36 Id. 
37 See WASEM, supra note 14, at 1. 
38 Susan L. Cutter, GI Science, Disasters, and Emergency Management, 7 
TRANSACTIONS IN GIS 439, 443 (2003), available at http://webra.cas.sc.edu/hvri/pubs/ 
2003_GIScienceDisastersAndEM.pdf. 
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might be affected by earthquakes or terrorist attacks.39 For instance, if better 
information on both the sizes of undocumented populations and the best 
means of communicating with undocumented populations was available, 
mandatory evacuation orders would reach more people40 and local 
governments would be better equipped to provide accurate information to 
assisting agencies, like FEMA, which can help mobilize emergency 
resources.41 And, practically speaking, first-responders would have a better 
idea about where to look for people possibly trapped after a disaster.42 
When governments have little information about the populations actually 
inhabiting an area, governments cannot adequately plan for evacuation 
before a disaster strikes. This problem affects people in two ways: first, 
undocumented immigrants are effectively excluded from government-
provided transportation and, second, undocumented immigrants without 
their own transportation simply cannot evacuate.43 After Hurricane Katrina, 
for instance, some estimate that around 100 thousand Latino residents 
(documented and undocumented) failed to evacuate the Gulf Coast before 
the storm solely because they did not have access to a vehicle.44 
Second, lack of resources continues to create problems for undocumented 
immigrants after a disaster has already occurred. As the National Research 
Council has written about social vulnerability and disasters: 
Lower-income and minority populations, who tend to have larger 
families, may also be reluctant to impose on friends and relatives 
for shelter. Lack of financial resources may leave less-well-off 
segments of the population less able to take time off from work 
                                                 
39 Id.; Cara Buckley, Bill Would Aid Relatives of 9/11 Immigrant Dead, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/23/nyregion/23families.html. 
40 Cutter, supra note 38, at 443. 
41 See id. 
42 Id. 
43 See VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 121. 
44 WHEN DISASTER STRIKES, supra note 12, at 7. 
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when disasters threaten, to travel long distances to avoid danger, or 
to pay for emergency lodging.45 
The same issues that create problems in the face of disasters continue to 
affect people during the response and recovery stages as well. 
Third, undocumented immigrants face barriers in the realm of 
communication, both in terms of language and contact. Although 
immigrants from Mexico and Latin America make up the biggest group of 
undocumented immigrants in the United States,46 the lack of Spanish 
language resources is pervasive47 (especially considering the sheer number 
of documented Spanish-speakers who also live in the United States48). As 
the government was preparing for Hurricane Katrina, it neglected to issue a 
warning in any language other than English in the Gulf Coast.49 Even in 
Southern California, where there is a large Spanish-speaking population and 
the threat of earthquakes and wildfires is high,50 there has been no serious 
effort to translate materials into Spanish; most efforts are aimed at using 
Spanish-language news outlets to direct pertinent information to Spanish-
speaking populations.51 
This problem affects documented and undocumented immigrants from 
other cultures as well. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, callers seeking 
information from FEMA were given two choices: English and Spanish.52 As 
                                                 
45 Comm. on Disaster Research in the Soc. Sci., Facing Hazards and Disasters: 
Understanding Human Dimensions, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. 130 
(2006),  http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11671&page=R1. 
46 Passel & Cohn, supra note 16, at 15. 
47 Ann Bessie Matthew & Kimiko Kelly, Disaster Preparedness in Urban Immigrant 
Communities: Lessons Learned from Recent Catastrophic Events and Their Relevance to 
Latino and Asian Communities in Southern California, TOMÁS RIVERA POL’Y INST. & 
ASIAN PAC. AM. LEGAL CENTER 6 (2008),  http://www.trpi.org/PDFs/ 
DISASTER_REPORT_Final.pdf. 
48 Id. 
49 WHEN DISASTER STRIKES, supra note 12, at 22. 
50 Matthew & Kelly, supra note 47, at 6. 
51 Id. 
52 Jonathan Blazer & Brett Murphy, Addressing the Needs of Immigrants and Limited 
English Communities in Disaster Planning and Relief: Lessons for Government, Disaster 
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a result, many Vietnamese immigrants were not aware of official FEMA 
shelters, and rather took shelter in “ethnic enclaves,” like the Hong Kong 
City Mall in Houston, TX.53 
The lack of language-specific resources causes problems beyond 
evacuation.54 After disasters, non-English speakers are effectively denied 
access to public health information (e.g., water safety) and information 
about where to obtain disaster aid and shelter.55 This lack of information is 
compounded by a lack of contact between government entities and 
undocumented (and documented) populations.56 
Because no official, language-specific information was disseminated 
through any channels before Hurricane Katrina, immigrant communities 
had to establish ad hoc methods for distributing information.57 Common 
methods of dissemination include using language-specific radio 
programming, religious institutions, and ethnic grocers.58 One report makes 
the observation that Hurricane Katrina was one of the most devastating 
disasters in US history, but immigrant populations had to rely on word-of-
mouth means of transmitting information.59 Unfortunately, this pattern of 
lack of contact between immigrant populations and the government repeats 
itself from disaster to disaster.60 
Finally, access to disaster aid is hampered by loss of documentation and 
loss of status. Loss of documentation refers to the literal, physical loss of 
immigration documentation.61 After disasters, many people are displaced 
                                                                                                       
Relief Agencies, and Community-Based Organizations, 22 IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS 
UPDATE 1, 7 (2008), available at http://www.ncg.org/s_ncg/assets/dpri/ 
NILCAddressingImmigrantsNeeds.pdf. 
53 Id. at 6. 
54 See WHEN DISASTER STRIKES, supra note 12, at 22. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 21. 
59 Id. at 22. 
60 See Matthew & Kelly, supra note 47, at 7. 
61 WASEM, supra note 14, at 2. 
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from their homes because their homes are destroyed or because emergency 
resources are only available elsewhere. Many Hurricane Katrina survivors 
faced these issues, but for immigrants who physically lost their immigration 
documents along with their homes, the impacts were especially 
devastating.62 Immigrants who were lawfully admitted into the United 
States and had work-authorization were denied the ability to obtain work 
legally 63 because employers are required to verify the work eligibility of all 
potential new hires, under penalty of sanction.64 Further, long-term disaster 
aid requires the submission of immigration documentation.65 
After disasters, not only do many authorized immigrants lack the 
documentation required to obtain the aid to which they are statutorily 
entitled, many face massive hurdles in terms of replacing their 
documentation.66 If government buildings and other critical infrastructure 
are damaged, immigrants can face lengthy delays before their 
documentation is replaced.67 For example, after Hurricane Katrina, the New 
Orleans court system and other basic governmental agencies were crippled 
due to the widespread destruction of their buildings.68 Such bureaucratic 
delays are lengthened in jurisdictions that have not adopted comprehensive 
disaster mitigation strategies, which can include measures like adequately 
backing up records and enabling employees to work from home.69 
“Loss of status” refers to immigrants who entered the United States under 
a visa requiring sponsorship.70 The United States grants a limited number of 
visas each year to petitioners who have a US-citizen family member or 
                                                 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2005). 
65 Disaster Assistance Frequently Asked Questions, FEMA (June 23, 2011), 
http://www.fema.gov/assistance/dafaq.shtm#citizen1. 
66 WASEM, supra note 14, at 2. 
67 Id. 
68 See Garrett & Tetlow, supra note 9, at 56. 
69 Id. 
70 WASEM, supra, note 14, at 7–8. 
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employer willing to sponsor the petitioner.71 If that family member dies in 
the course of the disaster or if that business is destroyed as a result of the 
disaster, then the visa holder no longer has sponsorship, and legal status is 
revoked.72 The timber industry was hard hit after Hurricane Katrina, and 
many workers lost their jobs and, therefore, their immigration status.73 
Because of the loss of immigration status, these workers were unable to 
obtain any other legal work, including work related to cleanup and 
rebuilding efforts that were desperately needed after the devastating 
hurricane.74 
Barriers to immigrants’ access to disaster aid include lack of government 
information about localized populations, lack of resources, poor 
communication, and loss of documentation and status. These issues are not 
always specific to undocumented immigrants; furthermore, the distinction 
between documented and undocumented is not always important or clear. 
The porousness of this distinction is best shown by the fact that immigrants 
who physically lose their documentation as a result of a disaster effectively 
become “undocumented” because they lose their ability to prove eligibility 
to work and to obtain long-term aid. Similarly, authorized immigrants 
whose statuses are revoked due to the effects of disasters actually become 
“undocumented.” 
2. Fear-Based Barriers 
Many immigrants, particularly undocumented immigrants, are distrustful 
of the government.75 This fear does not abate after a disaster, even when 
many people experience dire need.76 There are three main fear-based 
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 8–9. 
73 Elena Shore, Katrina Victims Denied Aid and Face Deportation, NEW AM. MEDIA, 
(Sept. 28, 2005), http://news.ncmonline.com/news/view_article.html?article_ 
id=69b9752a0c82041c78788e4390506983. 
74 Id. 
75 See HHS, CULTURAL COMPETENCE, supra note 15, at 14–17. 
76 Id. 
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barriers to obtaining disaster aid: (1) an anti-immigrant social and political 
climate, (2) a general wariness of government interaction, and (3) a specific 
fear of encountering authorities during the evacuation process. 
Unfortunately, fear-based barriers often prevent undocumented immigrants 
from obtaining not only government aid, but also private, nongovernmental 
aid.77 
The current social and political climate in the United States is hostile 
towards immigration.78 Social scientists posit that the general American 
attitude toward immigration changed after September 11, 2001, because 
Americans became much more concerned about national security.79 
Americans perceived “the threat” as originating outside the country, and, at 
some point, the focus shifted to protecting the nation’s borders.80 
Consequently, the attitude toward immigrants is now relatively hostile.81 
The United States’ current immigration policies reflect this hostile 
attitude and contribute to barriers that undocumented immigrants face in 
obtaining disaster aid. The US Department of Homeland Security’s 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Department (ICE) is detaining and 
deporting more undocumented immigrants each year,82 and given the 
current detention rates, the fear of deportation is well founded; in 2011, 
396,906 foreign nationals were deported by ICE.83 After an undocumented 
immigrant is detained by ICE, a world of uncertainty unfolds: not only can 
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 Regina Branton et al., All Along the Watchtower: Acculturation of Fear, Anti-Latino 
Effect, and Immigration, 73 J. OF POL. 664, 677 (2011). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 ICE Total Removals Through February 20th, 2012, ICE.GOV 1, http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/ero-removals1.pdf (last visited May 30, 2012). 
83 Id. 
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detentions last for years, but detainees do not know if, or when, they will 
see their families or be able to access legal counsel.84 
Distrust in the government may stem from cultural experience as well.85 
If an immigrant, documented or undocumented, came from a country where 
the government was unreliable or corrupt, it may be harder for that person 
to trust the US government.86 After a devastating hurricane in Alabama, for 
example, immigrants from Communist countries in Asia reported that they 
were generally distrustful of any government.87 Perhaps more surprisingly, 
many in the group surveyed were “not accustomed to receiving Government 
assistance,” and simply did not seek disaster aid.88 
Finally, undocumented immigrants have a particular fear of encountering 
government officials during the evacuation or aid-receipt processes.89 These 
fears are, unfortunately, not unfounded. After Hurricane Katrina, 
undocumented immigrants were detained in both Texas and West Virginia 
while using government-provided means of evacuation.90 These individuals 
are now facing deportation hearings.91 As discussed below, the US 
government typically does not give undocumented immigrants assurances 
that they will be free from prosecution if they seek assistance after a 
disaster.92 It is difficult to imagine voluntarily subjecting oneself to contact 
                                                 
84 See FAQ on Federal Immigration Reform, ESPERANZA IMMIGRANTS RTS. PROJECT, 
http://www.esperanza-la.org/faq-re-federal-immigration-detention.html (last visited Apr. 
2, 2012). 
85 HHS, CULTURAL COMPETENCE, supra note 15, at 15. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 Shore, supra note 73. The detainees in Texas allegedly voluntarily turned themselves 
over to immigration authorities and the detainees in West Virginia were detained while 
on an evacuation bus after one of the men was accused of attempting to assault someone. 
Id. The person he allegedly tried to assault did not press charges. Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
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with government authorities if detention and deportation could possibly 
result. 
All of these fear-based barriers contribute to low rates of undocumented 
immigrants obtaining disaster assistance.93 After the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake in California, many immigrants avoided disaster services due to 
their distrust of the government and fears of detention.94 In preparation for 
Hurricane Gustav in 2008, ICE said that although it would not be 
conducting any immigration enforcement activities in direct conjunction 
with disaster preparation or response, all people would need to register their 
information with authorities at various steps in the evacuation process.95 
Because such assurances are not taken seriously, given the choice between 
weathering the storm and evacuating, many undocumented immigrants (and 
their documented family members) do not evacuate, preferring to face 
injury—or even death—rather than risk separation from their families or 
deportation.96 
III. EXISTING FEDERAL POLICIES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
Federal law on the subject of undocumented populations and disaster aid 
is currently comprised of a patchwork of laws that fail to adequately address 
the needs of some 12 million individuals living in the United States. 
Because there is no congruent set of statutes that applies to undocumented 
immigrants in the specific context of disasters, a rule will often be applied 
in a manner that is inconsistent with another governing statute. By 
exploring ambiguities in the laws that apply to immigrants and disasters, 
this section details the applicable statutes and how their enforcement, or 
                                                 
93 HHS, CULTURAL COMPETENCE, supra note 15, at 20. 
94 Id. 
95 Angela Kelly, New Orleans Immigrants Weather the Storm, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 
4, 2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/angela-kelley/new-orleans-immigrants-
we_b_124103.html. 
96 Id.; Editorial, Hurricanes, Citizenship, and the Makings of an Unnatural Disaster, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2008, http://theboard.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/20/hurricanes-
citizenship-and-the-makings-of-an-unnatural-disaster/. 
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nonenforcement, creates consequences that are both unjust and unsafe. It 
then discusses several recent opportunities to specifically address the issue 
of undocumented immigrants and disaster aid. Finally, this section 
considers the use of agreements not to prosecute and the conference of 
Temporary Protected Status in the context of disasters. 
A. The Law is Ambiguous and Inconsistent 
There are federal laws that apply to government aid for undocumented 
immigrants in general and, likewise, there are federal laws that apply to the 
government’s role before, during, and after disasters.97 The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA) governs the types of government aid for which immigrants, 
documented and undocumented, are eligible.98 The Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (Stafford Act)99 
governs FEMA and the types of aid available after a presidentially declared 
disaster.100 This section looks at the laws that always apply, and that 
sometimes apply, to undocumented immigrants in relation to disasters, with 
a focus on the inconsistent results that sometimes arise. 
1. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 
Under PRWORA, undocumented immigrants101 are denied most federal 
public benefits.102 The public benefits denied to undocumented immigrants 
include “any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial 
                                                 
97 WASEM, supra note 14, at 2. 
98 Id. 
99 FARBER ET AL., supra note 6, at 90; 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5208 (2009). 
100 FARBER ET AL., supra note 6, at 90–91. 
101 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2012). The statute refers to undocumented immigrants as 
“unqualified aliens,” which is an entire subset of statutorily defined immigrants that 
includes undocumented immigrants. Id. For consistency, I will continue to use the phrase 
“undocumented immigrants.” 
102 Id. § 1611(a). 
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license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds 
of the United States,”103 as well as, 
[a]ny retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted 
housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment 
benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or 
assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family 
eligibility unit by an agency of the United States or by 
appropriated funds of the United States.104 
PRWORA not only defines “public benefit” very broadly, but it also 
purports to supersede all other provisions of law.105 
Despite what seems like a sweeping prohibition of federal aid for 
undocumented immigrants, PRWORA does contain several important 
exceptions. It allows for an exception related to disaster aid which provides 
for “short-term, non-cash, in-kind disaster relief.”106 Complementing the 
exception for disaster aid, PRWORA also allows undocumented immigrants 
to receive most emergency medical treatment107 and public health assistance 
relating to the immunization and treatment of communicable diseases.108 
The US attorney general is also charged with using his or her discretion 
to provide “programs, services, or assistance (such as soup kitchens, crisis 
counseling and intervention, and short-term shelter)” to undocumented 
immigrants.109 When implementing such services, the attorney general is 
obligated to consult with governmental agencies, specifically federal 
agencies that do the following: 
(i) deliver in-kind services at the community level, including 
through public or private nonprofit agencies; (ii) do not condition 
the provision of assistance, the amount of assistance provided, or 
                                                 
103 Id. § 1611(c)(1)(A). 
104 Id. § 1611 (c)(1)(B). 
105 See id. § 1611(a). 
106 Id. § 1611(b)(1)(B). 
107 Id. § 1611(b)(1)(A) (excluding transplants for undocumented immigrants). 
108 Id. § 1611(b)(1)(C). 
109 Id. § 1611(b)(1)(D). 
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the cost of assistance provided on the individual recipient’s income 
or resources; and (iii) are necessary for the protection of life or 
safety.110 
The attorney general is only able to use discretion when agencies or 
departments meet these requirements.111 Notably, the attorney general’s 
discretion does not extend to agencies that predicate public assistance on 
financial need.112 As such, undocumented immigrants are barred from many 
of the benefits which serve low-income populations. 
Although exceptions to the ban on federal funds to undocumented 
immigrants exist, PRWORA is still quite restrictive.113 It limits 
undocumented immigrants to short-term, noncash aid—which excludes 
funding to rebuild, evacuate using means other than government-sponsored 
transportation, or even purchase groceries and supplies.114   
2. The Stafford Act and FEMA Programs 
The Stafford Act (administered by FEMA) lays out the procedures for 
declaring a disaster, which is important because many of the Act’s 
provisions are not triggered until a disaster115 has been declared.116 In order 
for a disaster to be declared, the governor of the affected state must petition 
the president to declare a disaster.117 The governor must find “that the 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 See id.; §1611(b)(2) (also containing other exceptions that relate to benefits held by 
undocumented immigrants prior to the passage of the PRWORA in 1996, but those will 
not be discussed in this article because the fifteen-year-old exceptions are unlikely to 
apply widely at this point); see also Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
114 WASEM, supra note 14, at 8. 
115 The Stafford Act distinguishes between a “Major Disaster” and an “Emergency.” An 
emergency is an all-hazards-included category that is declared when it is deemed that the 
states need federal assistance. A major disaster is a natural catastrophe, even, in some 
cases, when the cause is unnatural. The procedures governing emergencies and disasters 
are very similar, but because this article makes no explicit mention of emergencies, and 
for the sake of simplicity, I will only refer to disasters. 
116 FARBER ET AL., supra note 6, at 90. 
117 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2012). 
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disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond 
the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that 
Federal assistance is necessary.”118 The governor must also show that he or 
she has complied with the state’s emergency management protocols and 
that the state will comply with the Stafford Act’s cost-sharing 
requirements.119 Even after a state has satisfied these requirements, the 
president has discretion over whether to declare a disaster.120 
When the disaster has been declared, the federal government may provide 
states with assistance in many forms. States may be able to utilize, with or 
without a reimbursement requirement, resources from federal agencies in all 
manners, from supplies and facilities to technical and advisory assistance.121 
FEMA is allowed to directly administer its programs in the affected state, or 
it can provide funding to the state and allow it to administer the benefits.122 
While FEMA has assistance programs for small businesses and 
communities to recover and continue providing essential services,123 this 
article is concerned with the specific types of aid available to individuals 
who are affected by disasters. Essentially, FEMA provides short-term and 
long-term aid to disaster victims, but the availability of aid for 
undocumented immigrants varies considerably. 
FEMA provides short-term aid that is available regardless of one’s 
immigration status.124 The aid “warns people about dangers, helps them 
leave dangerous places, and searches for lost people and rescues them. 
FEMA also provides transportation, emergency medical care, crisis 
counseling, and emergency shelter to whomever needs them. And it 
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121 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a)(3) (2012). 
122 FARBER ET AL., supra note 6, at 97. 
123 Id. at 97–98. 
124 Immigrant Eligibility for Disaster Assistance, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., www.nilc.org/ 
document.html?id=24 (last visited May 25, 2012). 
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provides emergency food, water, medicine, and other supplies to meet 
disaster victims’ basic needs.”125 This sort of aid does not include cash 
benefits because FEMA must comply with PRWORA requirements, as 
discussed above.126 
The receipt of long-term aid is contingent on immigration status. Long-
term aid includes cash benefits as well as aid directed toward repairing or 
replacing one’s home.127 It can also include nonemergency medical 
expenses, clean-up, and legal fees.128 This sort of aid is “restricted,” 
meaning one must be either a US citizen or a “qualified alien” to receive the 
assistance.129 Undocumented immigrants cannot obtain this sort of aid 
unless they are applying on behalf of their minor children who are US 
citizens.130 
FEMA does not have a specific policy when it comes to its treatment of 
undocumented immigrants’ personal information.131 After 9/11 and after 
Hurricane Charley in 2004, FEMA announced that it would refrain from 
sharing an individual’s immigration status, but such assurances are not 
made regularly, leading to the conclusion that FEMA does not have a policy 
on which undocumented immigrants or their advocates can rely.132 This is 
particularly problematic because FEMA is an agency within the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), which also houses ICE.133 Considering the 
close proximity of these two agencies, it seems necessary to have a strict 
confidentiality procedure in place for FEMA. 
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126 Id. 
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128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Karen Tumlin & Jonathan Blazer, Administration’s Failure to Reassure Leads to 
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3. Issue of Aid to Undocumented Immigrants Has Not Been Addressed 
Despite Opportunities to Do So 
After Hurricane Katrina, the Stafford Act was amended by the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act).134 
Mainly as a response to 9/11, FEMA was reorganized to address the threat 
of terrorism.135 After the 2005 disaster response to Katrina, Congress 
restructured FEMA by elevating its position within the DHS and by giving 
the FEMA administrator a direct link to the president.136 
The Post-Katrina Act reiterated FEMA’s goals and made it clear that 
FEMA is meant to prepare and respond to national disasters of any kind: 
The primary mission of the Agency is to reduce the loss of life and 
property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural 
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by 
leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive 
emergency management system of preparedness, protection, 
response, recovery, and mitigation.137 
By reiterating FEMA’s broad focus in the Post-Katrina Act, Congress 
demonstrated that disaster response is a priority in the federal government. 
The Post-Katrina Act addressed other concerns related to disaster 
response, such as banning discrimination based on English proficiency.138 
The Stafford Act now prohibits discrimination based on “race, color, 
religion, nationality, sex, age, disability, English proficiency, or economic 
status.”139 The Post-Katrina Act also explicitly requires the FEMA 
Administrator to identify Limited English Proficiency (LEP) populations in 
areas vulnerable to disasters.140 The Post-Katrina Act requires the 
government to communicate with LEP populations by means which these 
                                                 
134 Id. at 133. 
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138 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) (2012). 
139 Id. 
140 42 U.S.C. § 5196f(a) (2012) (coordinating with state and local entities). 
278 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
populations understand.141 FEMA, however, has discretion over 
determining how many people constitute a “population,” so if FEMA 
determines that there are too few people with limited English in an area, it 
remains exempt from providing information in the LEP population’s 
language.142 
The Post-Katrina Act represented an excellent opportunity to modify the 
law of disaster response in a way that allowed better coverage for more 
people. Indeed, requiring non-English materials for disaster victims is a 
good, but not perfect, step toward providing information to undocumented 
populations. The Act could have been amended to address undocumented 
immigrants specifically, and failing to do so ensures that a large number of 
people are excluded from certain kinds of benefits and even protection from 
prosecution after a disaster. 
4. The Government Inconsistently Grants Temporary Protected Status 
and Agreements Not to Prosecute 
After a disaster, the attorney general and the DHS secretary have the 
ability to ensure that undocumented immigrants, or the people who employ 
them, will not be prosecuted for immigration violations.143 These 
agreements, however, are provided inconsistently and, thus, do not provide 
any real benefit to disaster victims. This section explores the kinds of 
protection available to employers and individuals when the disaster occurs 
both without and within the borders of the United States. 
The attorney general or the DHS secretary has the ability to assure 
employers that they will not be targeted for employing undocumented 
immigrants after a disaster.144 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
requires employers to verify the alienage of potential employees.145 This 
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requirement applies to foreign nationals as well as to citizens, and it makes 
it illegal for employers to hire employees without first verifying their 
employment eligibility.146 The attorney general and the DHS secretary have 
the ability to waive this requirement by assuring employers that they will 
not be prosecuted for failing to verify alienage and employment 
eligibility.147 
After Hurricane Katrina, DHS announced that it would not initiate 
employer sanctions for forty-five days.148 This announcement made no 
mention of protection for undocumented immigrants directly, but it was 
enough to create an uptick in immigration, particularly of Latinos, to New 
Orleans after the storm.149 Because employers were assured they would not 
be prosecuted, employers were actually actively seeking undocumented 
laborers to assist with the rebuilding effort.150 
Although offering employers assurance that they will not be prosecuted 
for employing undocumented immigrants may seem like a decent solution, 
in practice it actually allows for exploitation and the furtherance of 
discriminatory attitudes.151 After Katrina, when employers were assured 
they would not be prosecuted, employers in many states hired 
undocumented workers to do hard clean-up jobs for up to eighty hours per 
week at a rate of $8–12 per hour.152 Due to the chaotic circumstances, there 
is little data relating to whether employees were provided with any safety 
equipment to protect them from toxic debris.153 Further, there are reports of 
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undocumented immigrants receiving less pay than promised, or no pay at 
all, for which there is little recourse.154 
After the federal government agreed not to prosecute and the number of 
immigrants rose in the Gulf States, so did the prevalence of 
discrimination.155 While speaking with a group of local business owners, 
New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin asked, “How do I make sure New Orleans 
is not overrun with Mexican workers?”156 While his city was being cleaned 
up and rebuilt by Latino immigrants, Mayor Nagin still expressed such 
sentiments. Although he attempted to distance himself from his comments, 
those words have often been repeated to illustrate the prevailing 
discriminatory attitudes post disaster.157 
The federal government has the ability to provide direct assurances to 
immigrants living in the United States when the disaster occurs in a foreign 
country.158 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) ensures that immigrants are 
not forced to return to their home nation when that nation is unstable due to 
a disaster.159 While the goal is to protect immigrants with expired visas, 
TPS is also available to all undocumented immigrants from nations the 
United States deems unsafe. The undocumented immigrants, however, must 
apply for TPS, which means they must register with DHS.160 
TPS has been conferred many times by the federal government to 
immigrants from certain countries. TPS is considered when US officials feel 
that deporting foreign nationals would be dangerous.161 For instance, it was 
conferred upon foreign nationals of various Central American nations after 
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Hurricane Mitch in 1998.162 After the Haitian earthquake in 2010, Haitian 
nationals living in the United States were granted TPS. Although the status 
was set to expire, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano extended it because 
conditions in Haiti had not improved.163 Most recently, Secretary 
Napolitano granted TPS to Syrians living in the United States.164 TPS can 
be conferred for a variety of reasons and can be extended if the conditions 
in the foreign country do not improve, which demonstrates the program’s 
flexibility.165 
When the disaster takes place inside the United States, however, there are 
no official, discretionary actions that the attorney general or DHS secretary 
can take to grant TPS to undocumented immigrants.166 In fact, there are 
very few instances of undocumented immigrants obtaining amnesty or some 
sort of protected status in the wake of disasters that occurred in the United 
States. Even after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, two of the most iconic and 
devastating natural disasters in recent history, undocumented immigrants 
were never promised freedom from prosecution, either in terms of 
evacuation or employment.167 
After September 11th, however, Congress decided to grant amnesty to 
undocumented immigrants who had been victims of the attack.168 
Additionally, undocumented immigrants were not denied financial 
                                                 
162 See Steven David Forester, Haitians Deserve Protected Status, SUN SENTINEL, Sept. 
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compensation. They were able to participate in the September 11th Victims 
Compensation Fund, and were provided with free 9/11-related healthcare 
without having to provide documentation.169 Certainly the benefits 
conferred after 9/11 are different because they were largely within the 
context of a bill to bailout the airline industry,170 but is one disaster really so 
different from another? 
B. Consequences Are Unsafe and Unjust 
The consequences of these policies are both unsafe and unjust. Although 
FEMA is now required to provide language-specific information for LEP 
populations, it continues to struggle with disseminating information to 
disaster victims.171 Even if FEMA were able to provide perfect information 
to LEP populations, there are still no policies to cure the fundamental lack 
of trust in the government that many immigrants have; thus, the barriers to 
obtaining disaster aid have not been removed.172 FEMA, which has only 
recently been prohibited from discriminating based on language, must 
overcome a long history of discrimination173 in order to gain the trust of the 
populations it is statutorily required to serve under the Stafford Act.174 
Granting immunity from prosecution to employers who hire 
undocumented workers after a disaster, while neglecting to provide such 
assurances to individuals, further enforces the employer’s superior 
bargaining power.175 Instances of exploitation tend to be rampant after 
disasters, and are well-documented in employment relationships.176 
                                                 
169 Id.; see Devlin Barrett, Immigration Issue Threatens 9/11 Bill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870447120457521064277865 
1102.html. 
170 OUT OF THE ASHES: 9/11, supra note 168. 
171 See Shore, supra note 73. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a). 
175 See Donato & Hakimzadeh, supra note 149. 
176 Id. 
No Shelter From the Storm 283 
VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 1 • 2012 
Additionally, providing assurances only to employers sends the message 
that it is only undocumented immigrants that are doing something illegal 
while employers are simply given a free pass in terms of verifying 
documentation.177 This message reinforces discriminatory attitudes and 
relationships.178 
Inconsistently granting TPS, amnesty, or agreements not to prosecute 
exacerbates fear in an already traumatic situation.179 It reinforces the idea 
that governments are not trustworthy and that laws are unequally applied.180 
It is also fundamentally unfair to privilege the victims of one disaster over 
the victims of another disaster. The victims of hurricanes are equally 
deserving of amnesty and non-prosecution agreements as are the victims of 
9/11. Likewise, from a human rights perspective, undocumented immigrants 
who are the victims of disasters that take place in the United States are no 
less deserving of assistance than are foreign nationals whose home 
countries experience disasters.181 
As a result of these policies, undocumented immigrants do not evacuate 
and do not seek disaster aid because there is little communication about the 
kinds of aid available and undocumented immigrants are unwilling to 
register with the state.182 Furthermore, organizations providing assistance 
and guidance to undocumented immigrants are ill-equipped to give good 
advice regarding the best course of action after a disaster. It is unknown 
how an agency like FEMA will treat an undocumented person’s 
information, or whether it is working in tandem with ICE, also a DHS 
agency.183 The current federal policies have been revised, but not enough; 
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the current policies leave in place most of the barriers to obtaining disaster 
aid that undocumented immigrants face. 
IV. HOW OTHER ORGANIZATIONS RESPOND TO UNDOCUMENTED 
IMMIGRANTS   
Other organizations, both within the government and in the private 
sector, also contend with how to include undocumented immigrants in 
programs without disclosing immigration status to ICE. This section 
discusses some of the more successful models used by agencies and private 
entities, with a close look at the US Census Bureau and the American Red 
Cross, as well as the ideals espoused in the UN’s Guiding Principles on 
Internally Displaced Persons. 
A. Government Agencies 
US government agencies must reconcile their missions, which are often 
related to serving and keeping safe the population, with restrictions on aid 
to undocumented people.184 The PRWORA, discussed above, severely 
limits the amount and kind of aid available to undocumented people living 
in the United States.185 Government agencies must also decide how to treat 
information supplied by undocumented immigrants. Such information is not 
treated consistently among the various agencies, and there is no governing 
statute in place.186 
The Census Bureau has the most restrictive confidentiality policy.187 The 
Census Bureau’s mission is to accurately and completely obtain information 
for statistical purposes.188 It is required to keep information about 
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individuals absolutely private. This restriction applies to every Census 
Bureau employee for life, and there is a severe penalty for violations.189 
The goal of the Census Bureau is fundamentally different than the goal of 
FEMA. The Census Bureau is only concerned with accurately counting the 
people within the United States, while FEMA is charged with helping 
communities to plan for, respond to, and recover from disasters. Unlike 
FEMA, the Census Bureau is in no way concerned with distributing aid.190 
Despite this fundamental difference, the policies of FEMA should be 
similar to those of the Census Bureau because neither organization is 
concerned with prosecuting undocumented immigrants. Recent amendments 
to the Stafford Act demonstrate that FEMA is expected to carry out its 
mandate without regard to an individual’s status, but in order to remove 
existing fear-based barriers, FEMA must adopt a strict policy of 
confidentiality so undocumented immigrants, as well as citizens and 
authorized immigrants with undocumented family members, are able to feel 
secure in obtaining life-saving aid. 
B. Private Entities 
Private entities have far more flexibility in terms of providing aid and not 
requiring immigration documentation. Because they are not bound by the 
strict constraints of the PRWORA, private entities may provide many kinds 
of aid to undocumented people.191 Private organizations are the best 
resource available to undocumented immigrants after a disaster, and the 
American Red Cross presents, despite some instances of discrimination,192 
an excellent example of how to fairly provide aid to undocumented 
immigrants.193 
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The American Red Cross emphasizes providing humanitarian aid.194 
Because it keeps this focus central, it is able to treat information about 
immigration status with respect, offer many kinds of relief, and mobilize 
effectively to serve vulnerable populations.195 When interviewing disaster 
victims, the American Red Cross does not ask for information regarding 
immigration status.196 Unlike FEMA, the Red Cross simply does not require 
such information.197 Further, the American Red Cross has a strict policy that 
if information regarding immigration status is disclosed to a Red Cross 
employee, that information is neither shared nor recorded.198 
The American Red Cross also provides many kinds of services, 
regardless of whether a disaster victim is an undocumented immigrant.199 
The benefits available from the American Red Cross include shelter, 
medical care, mental health care, and even cash benefits to “pay for 
groceries, new clothes, rent, emergency home repairs, transportation, 
medicines, and tools.”200 The American Red Cross helps to fill the 
significant gap left by the federal government’s strict policies denying such 
aid to undocumented immigrants.201 
Finally, the American Red Cross model allows for flexibility to meet the 
varying needs of specific populations.202 It is a large organization with 
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many chapters, including international chapters.203 After wildfires in 
California, the American Red Cross did not have the resources to meet the 
needs of Spanish-language-only populations.204 To remedy this situation, 
the local Red Cross chapter enlisted the help of the Mexican chapter of the 
Red Cross, which was able to supply Spanish-speaking aid workers and 
Spanish-language materials to victims.205 This scenario demonstrates that 
the American Red Cross is able to adapt and utilize resources in a way that 
actually keeps disaster victims at the center of the conversation. 
As a final note, there are documented instances in which the Red Cross 
has discriminated based on language or national origin, particularly after 
Hurricane Katrina.206 These instances, while certainly disappointing, seem 
to be isolated and not the norm. If anything, these instances further 
demonstrate the need for reform in terms of the universal availability of 
disaster aid. 
C. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons 
The United Nations has established guiding principles for the treatment 
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) that are “consistent with international 
human rights law and international humanitarian rights law.”207 IDPs 
include those who has been forced to leave their homes as the result of 
“armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human 
rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an 
internationally recognized State border.”208 The principles, which include 
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the right to food, shelter, and medical services,209 are to be provided to all 
IDPs without discrimination, specifically including race- and status-based 
discrimination.210 The principles also specify that IDPs should be able to 
remain with their families, have freedom of movement throughout the 
country, and be “protected from discriminatory arrest and detention as a 
result of their displacement.”211 
Although these guiding principles are legally unenforceable, the United 
States should use the sentiment behind the guiding principles to shape its 
disaster response policies.212 The US Agency for International Aid (USAID) 
already uses these principles when establishing response plans in 
international areas that have been affected by disasters and conflicts.213 Use 
of the UN guiding principles to shape disaster policy would promote a 
scheme in which it would be impermissible for the US government to 
discriminate against and detain undocumented immigrants after a 
disaster.214 Two key reasons support this proposition: first, USAID requires 
other countries to follow the principles, and the United States should 
practice what it preaches;215 second, as Robert R.M. Verchick writes, 
fairness requires “stay[ing] informed about the needs of others and 
[treating] them as your own.”216 
V. DISCUSSION OF A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR FEMA 
As the previous sections illustrate, there are many gaps and inequalities 
in the administration of disaster aid to undocumented populations. Not only 
would amending the Stafford Act and improving communication with and 
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outreach to undocumented communities help fill those gaps, but such 
measures might also facilitate government entities’ fulfillment of their 
humanitarian missions. Improving access to disaster aid might also provide 
for stronger communities. 
A. Amend the Stafford Act 
The Stafford Act, although it has been amended recently, should be 
further changed to allow for better implementation of disaster response 
policies. This section discusses three recommendations: (1) remove FEMA 
from DHS control completely; (2) keep any information collected about 
immigration status strictly confidential; and (3) allow a presidential disaster 
declaration to automatically trigger protection from detention and 
deportation for undocumented immigrants who are victims of the disaster. 
1. Remove FEMA from DHS Control 
The Post-Katrina Act elevated FEMA’s status within the DHS,217 but it 
should have removed it from DHS completely because DHS should not be 
home to agencies whose missions are completely discrete. FEMA, an 
agency that is charged with providing disaster preparation and relief, has 
goals that are fundamentally different than those of ICE, which include 
enforcing immigration laws and keeping US borders safe.218 Essentially, 
ICE’s enforcement duties conflict with FEMA’s humanitarian mission 
because it could be in a position to prosecute the very people FEMA is 
charged with assisting.219 
Separating FEMA completely from DHS will not be particularly difficult 
because it has a history as a standalone entity.220 Before DHS was 
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established in 2002, FEMA was completely independent.221 Furthermore, 
due to recent reorganization, FEMA is now fairly independent within DHS, 
and, for instance, has its own administrator with a direct link to the 
president and Congress.222 Any criticism that it would be too cumbersome 
to reorganize FEMA to be completely independent from DHS should 
simply be met with a recitation of FEMA’s history as an independent 
agency. 
2. Keep Any Information Collected About Immigration Status 
Confidential 
The Stafford Act should also be explicitly amended to keep information 
related to immigration status confidential. Specifically, the Stafford Act 
should recognize the precarious situations in which many disaster victims 
find themselves, and should refrain from asking about immigration status 
altogether. FEMA should adopt the policies of the Red Cross and refrain 
from recording information relating to status. 
Disregarding or keeping confidential the immigration status of disaster 
victims confidential has two key benefits. First, undocumented immigrants 
will be more likely to feel safe, and will be more likely to come forward, 
participate in evacuations, and request aid. Second, if information about 
immigration status is not collected, it will be more difficult to enforce the 
strict aid-related limits imposed by the PRWORA and undocumented 
immigrants would be more likely to obtain long-term and cash aid. These 
benefits further the ultimate goal of all disaster relief efforts, which is to 
improve quality of life for disaster victims. 
Ideally, FEMA would refrain from considering any information related to 
immigration status, but even if it were to continue to consider this 
information, it should ensure that the information is kept unequivocally 
confidential. This solution would not allow undocumented immigrants to 
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receive long-term or cash aid, but it would, for example, provide security 
for undocumented parents who apply on behalf of citizen children. While 
this is not the ideal solution, it is certainly an improvement over the current 
policy. 
Some may argue that allowing undocumented immigrants to receive aid 
without providing documentation, or that even forcing FEMA to keep 
immigration status information confidential, is wrongfully allowing 
undocumented immigrants to benefit at the expense of taxpayers. However, 
undocumented immigrants, regardless of one’s views on immigration 
policy, are still victims of disasters and should be treated in a way that 
maximizes safety and health. In its most benign form, this suggestion 
simply allows undocumented immigrants to claim benefits to which they 
are entitled under the current state of the law, but without fear of detention 
as a direct result of seeking disaster relief. 
3. Allow a Presidential Disaster Declaration to Automatically Trigger 
Protection for Undocumented Immigrants Who Are Victims of the 
Disaster 
A presidential disaster declaration should automatically trigger TPS, or 
something similar, for undocumented immigrants who are victims of a 
disaster. There are three key benefits of this sort of program. First, 
eliminating some fear and uncertainty after a disaster will promote 
participation of undocumented immigrants in the disaster response process. 
Second, undocumented immigrants will be able to participate in rebuilding 
efforts without experiencing high rates of exploitation. Third, communities 
will be strengthened when all people are able to participate in the rebuilding 
effort. 
As discussed previously,223 many undocumented immigrants are unlikely 
to use government channels to receive aid for fear-based reasons. Allowing 
undocumented immigrants some kind of TPS, ideally one in which 
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individuals are not required to register with the Immigration and 
Nationalization Service (INS), will help alleviate the fear that many 
undocumented individuals have of encountering government officials while 
evacuating or staying in shelters. It will also alleviate the fear that 
undocumented members of families will be separated. Robert R. M. 
Verchick suggests that developing disaster-specific policies before a 
disaster actually occurs will increase certainty and response times.224 In his 
example, ICE would have an established policy for evacuations, which 
would avoid “last-minute wrangling between social activists and 
immigration officials about document checks.”225 
If a firm, established policy was effectively communicated to immigrant 
populations, it would help undocumented immigrants by increasing 
certainty that they would not be detained while evacuating and, thus, 
encourage swift action to find safety.226 After Hurricane Gustav, DHS 
announced that it would allow immigrants to use public transportation to 
evacuate, but activists said this announcement came too late.227 While 
advocates would have preferred to send people into immigrant communities 
to explain DHS’s statement in person, they settled on making 
announcements on Spanish-language radio stations.228 Had the policy been 
in place before the evacuation was imminent, many more communities 
could have been notified.229 
After disasters that take place inside the United States, undocumented 
immigrants are usually not given TPS although they themselves are victims. 
When employers are occasionally given assurances that they will not be 
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prosecuted for INA violations, the result is an influx of undocumented 
workers in communities.230 However, the effect is a shadow community that 
ends up doing difficult post-disaster labor and can be exploited.231 Allowing 
TPS for undocumented immigrants after disasters may help to eliminate 
exploitation and unsafe working conditions after disasters because the 
process would be completely legal and transparent. 
Finally, allowing undocumented immigrants to safely participate in the 
community rebuilding process benefits everyone because communities can 
be rebuilt faster.232 Further, providing a legitimate framework where 
undocumented immigrants are not afraid of detainment and deportation can 
result in communities that are better integrated.233 This effect was partially 
illustrated when DHS agreed not to prosecute employers after Hurricane 
Katrina, but the stigma inflicted on the undocumented workers themselves 
remained, as evidenced by increased hostility toward immigrants now that 
construction jobs are available.234 Allowing for a completely legal situation 
will help eliminate that stigma, enabling undocumented immigrants to 
benefit in the very communities they are helping to rebuild. 
Critics of the suggestion to allow something like TPS for undocumented 
disaster victims following a presidential disaster declaration will also argue 
that undocumented immigrants would wrongfully benefit from the aid. This 
argument ignores the fact that undocumented immigrants will actually 
participate in rebuilding efforts. It is neither fair nor just to allow 
undocumented immigrants to complete the difficult and dangerous work of 
cleaning and rebuilding a disaster-stricken area while in fear of detention. 
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Additionally, without TPS, there is an opportunity for the unscrupulous to 
exploit undocumented immigrants who have little viable recourse. 
B. Improve Communication and Outreach in Undocumented Communities 
FEMA should also improve communication and outreach in 
undocumented populations. The Red Cross provides an excellent example 
of how to do this.235 The Red Cross has used an inter-agency approach to 
reach vulnerable populations with great results.236 FEMA should collaborate 
with agencies—federal, state, and local—to learn about undocumented 
populations before a disaster strikes and to provide assistance to those 
populations after a disaster strikes. 
FEMA needs to learn more about undocumented populations, especially 
those that are in places likely to be affected by a disaster. It needs to learn 
where these populations are located, how many people live in the areas, and 
how to best communicate with them so they can adequately plan for 
evacuations and adequately inform the populations. 
FEMA also needs to tailor its practices to meet the needs of 
undocumented populations. After Hurricane Katrina, many immigrants 
chose ethnic centers over official shelters, and many such immigrants 
cannot remember a government official ever visiting their ad hoc shelters.237 
In addition to simply considering undocumented populations in disaster 
planning, FEMA needs to be proactive in preparing language- and culture-
specific announcements and flyers, and in using methods of mass 
communication that will be heard by undocumented populations.238 
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Critics may argue that it is too cumbersome to require FEMA to improve 
outreach and communication with undocumented populations. There are 
two key responses to this argument. First, the Post-Katrina Act already 
imposes this duty on FEMA. Second, FEMA is meant to provide a 
coordinational framework between agencies and organizations to facilitate 
disaster response, relief, and recovery. Hence, of any agency currently 
operating, it should be the least cumbersome for FEMA to utilize the skills 
and resources of other groups. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Undocumented immigrants make up 4 percent of the US population.239 
Current census information indicates that many undocumented immigrants 
have families that are established in the United States, or are part of families 
that are comprised of both authorized immigrants or citizens and 
undocumented immigrants.240 There is also a significant level of disparity in 
terms of education and income that plagues undocumented immigrants, and 
as such, they are some of the people most vulnerable to disasters. 
Further, undocumented immigrants face many barriers to obtaining 
disaster assistance. Logistic barriers range from inability to communicate in 
English or through “regular” channels to physical loss of documentation 
paperwork after a disaster. Other barriers are based on fear of government 
interaction, which is a real and legitimate concern. These barriers prevent 
undocumented immigrants from receiving aid after disasters. 
Our current federal policies contribute to these barriers and recent 
reforms do little to remove them. The PRWORA effectively prohibits the 
federal government from providing undocumented immigrants with 
substantial aid, the Stafford Act does not require FEMA to provide all kinds 
of aid regardless of status or even to keep information regarding status 
confidential, and there is no clear guideline for conferring a protected 
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immigration status on undocumented immigrants after disasters. Despite 
opportunities to change these policies, they remain in place and prevent 
undocumented immigrants from obtaining aid. 
In order to remedy some of these problems, FEMA should be removed 
from the DHS to prevent a conflict of interest with ICE and its enforcement 
mandates, immigration status should not be used as a factor in determining 
eligibility for any kind of FEMA disaster aid, TPS should be automatically 
conferred when the president declares a disaster, and FEMA should rework 
its communication and outreach practices to include (and better serve) 
undocumented populations. To do all of these things, FEMA should look to 
the policies of agencies such as the US Census Bureau and organizations 
like the American Red Cross. 
Disasters are tragic events, but they are made more tragic by the ways in 
which our federal government responds to them. Instead of allowing 
disaster response to become an opportunity to demonstrate a “tough stance” 
on immigration, disaster response should center on offering comprehensive 
aid to every victim. It is patently unjust to allow immigration politics or fear 
to prevent people from seeking aid that would ultimately allow individuals, 
families, and communities to most effectively recover from disasters, 
whether they be natural or man-made. 
